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
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Three New Concepts

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Religion and Authority:

The Correct Concepts

ALSO

A Hitherto Unnamed Mental Faculty

BY

EUGENE H. WOOD, A. M., M. D.

WHEN YOU KNOW A THING, TO HOLD THAT YOU KNOW IT; AND WHEN YOU DO NOT KNOW A THING, TO ALLOW THAT YOU DO NOT KNOW IT—THIS IS KNOWLEDGE.—CONFUCIUS.

DO NOT PRETEND THAT CONCLUSIONS ARE CERTAIN WHICH ARE NOT DEMONSTRATED.—PROF. HUXLEY.

EXPERIENCE HAS LONG SINCE DISSIPATED MY FAITH IN MENS' RATIONALITY.—HERBERT SPENCER.

PUBLISHED FOR THE AUTHOR BY
ROBERT E. WOOD
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1901

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DEDICATION

THIS BOOK
IS DEDICATED BY THE AUTHOR
TO
THE UNIFICATION OF THE CHURCH;
TO
THE EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY
BY
THOSE UPON WHOM IT HAS BEEN AND
SHALL BE BESTOWED
FOR THE
BENEFIT OF MANKIND;
AND TO
THE CULT OF TERTIANATION
TOWARD
AUTHORITY.

PREFACE,

The dedication sounds some new notes to the people of the earth at the beginning of a new century.

I. The Unification of the Church.

Who will take up the work? There is one God and religion is one thing. Why then may not all sects unite and form a universal church? Do creeds, dogmas and doctrines prevent such unity? Creeds, doctrines and dogmas are mental cobwebs that obscure the perceptions of the churchmen, and all are the invention of man designed solely to hold mankind in subjection to ecclesiastical authority. This, not elsewhere referred to in these pages, is submitted to voluntarily on the part of those who join any church organization; so they can be released from such connection—the ties which bind in membership being voluntarily assumed may be voluntarily severed. That is, however, apart from the point—which is the unity of the church having one God and one religion. Who will undertake to found "The American Church"—which will bring all church

organizations into its fold; which will tear down and build up anew; which will have for its chief object the beneficent exercise of authority by all upon whom it shall be conferred and which will have for its principal propogandum the cult of tertianation toward authority by whomsoever exercised? The needs of humanity and the requirements of human society demand for the new century a new church, founded on new lines, to supplant the old. The master minds of the time can devote their energies to no work more potent with good to mankind.

II. The Exercise of Authority for the Benefit of Mankind.

In these days of self-seeking, of self-interest and of self-aggrandizement it is rare to find a person striving to obtain the gift of authority from his fellows in order to use it for the general good. But that is the purpose of its bestowal. Authority to make laws is given that righteous laws shall be made. Authority to execute laws is given that the laws shall be enforced according to their meaning and intention. Authority to administer and interpret laws is bestowed upon the judiciary in order that the laws shall be administered with justice. The saying that "public office is a public trust" conveys an erroneous idea—the thing entrusted to an

official is authority, and his duties are prescribed by law or are of a perfunctory character. There can be no such thing as the "abuse of authority" but those subject to it can be abused by its perverted exercise.

When the correct concept of the nature of authority is understood by the people who bestow it upon persons to serve them in official capacities, and when the recipients of the preponderance of authority understand the true nature of the gift and the purpose of its bestowal, to-wit: that it shall be exercised solely for the benefit of society—the whole of society—and not for the special benefit of those who have bestowed it upon them—society will have attained its ideal state. The most imperative duty, the most binding obligation imposed by the bestowal of authority is that its possessor shall exercise it according to his best judgement and not at the dictates of his discretion. Acts of discretion spring from motives of self, while authority is not a personal matter and should always be exercised impersoally.

In subsequent pages the story of Balaam is cited as an illustration. Balaam is referred to as the representative of ecclesiasticism, the Angel, sword in hand, embodies authority, and the Ass stands for the people, for the laity or for that very learned euphemism

of ecclesiastical invention—the proletariat.

The Ass was between two masters, as the people, whose prototype she was, are to-day, between those who wield authority for self-aggrandisement, first, last and all the time, (officialdom) and ecclesiasticism. Balaam's ass saved her master from extermination by recognizing the Angel as superior to him. If mankind shall recognize authority as the supremest thing on earth and shall understand its nature they can get rid of one master—ecclesiasticism—a master of whom they have been as unwittingly the savior as the ass was of Balaam. Then they can lighten the burden imposed by the other master by bestowing authority only upon those worthy of receiving it, upon those who will exercise it benignly and for the general good.

III. The Cult of Tertianation toward and as regards Authority.

Religion is the exercise of tertianation toward and as regards God. In fact the faculty has been cultivated almost exclusively in this direction—if not to the detriment of society, at least to the neglect of its exercise toward the other relations of life. It may be said that tertianating toward a being who is to all unknowable, and must consequently be imagined, has come to be regarded by a few persons as a mere superstition, it will

nevertheless, hold sway over the minds of men while the world endures. But neither the fear of God nor the fear of man restrains mankind wholly from vice and crime, and it is a mooted question as to which has the most restraining power over society. There can be no question, however, that if tertianation toward authority were cultivated with the same care and assiduity as are bestowed upon the cultivation of tertianation toward God the former would prove to be the greater safeguard of society. To learn to tertianate toward authority is one of life's most important lessons Then let it become the cult of the rising and of future generations!

Definitions to be correct should be definitive, specific and comprehensible; if they do not follow these lines they are not definitions. When Herbert Spencer says that "religion is an *a priori* theory of the universe"—is that a definition of the word? Does the phrase express in comprehensible terms a distinct concept? By no means, and the various definitions of religion quoted in the following pages are of a like character. Since none of them meets the requirements of lexicology *delenda sunt*; the same fate will befall the existing definitions of authority.

Many more definitions of the word religion might have been obtained, but *cui bono*? The writer might have addressed the question : " What is religion ? " to all the pastors, priests, ministers, rectors, bishops and archbishops in the United States. He might have sent the qnestiou even to the pope himself, and to all the clergy in Europe, and he would doubtless have received enough of replies to make up a large volume of diversely phrased definitions—none of which would have expressed the correct concept. By refraining from such ubiquitous questioning the writer has saved many estimable gentlemen from the chagrin they would feel when they would learn that their definitions were incorrect. For this considerateness on his part their thanks are due to him. Instead of making such tender they each may purchase a copy of this book.

A collection of definitions, such as is indicated above, would illustrate in a marked manner the great variance of human ideas in regard to an unvarying concept, and would demonstrate that many teachers of religion have no very clear and definite idea of its nature. That deficiency is supplied by this volume. Hereafter no person will need to plead ignorance of the correct concepts of religion and of authority.

The word "religion" is often misused. Thus if a man is represented, in fiction, to be greatly infatuated with a woman, so that he may be said to worship her, she is said to be his "religion." Or, if a man or a woman pursues any object, with great ardor of purpose, with intense desire and devotion he or she is said to make such pursuit of such object his or her "religion." The use of the term in this sense is confined almost wholly to works of fiction. Perhaps the use of the word in that sense by writers of fiction may be permitted to them, not as the license of good usage, but because the statement is pure invention—a figment of the brain. To matter-of-fact persons, however, and to those who are scrupulous about the exact use of words the statement is an absurdity—a contemptible absurdity.

The *raison d'etre* for this brochure, or rather perhaps, the excuse for the existence of this book may be found in the following extract from the writings of Herbert Spencer:

Whoever hesitates to utter that which he thinks the highest truth, lest it might be too much in advance of the time, may reassure himself by looking at his acts from an impersonal point of view. Let him duly realize the fact that opinion is the agency through which character adapts external arrange-

ments to itself—that his opinion rightly forms part of this agency—is a unit of force, constituting with other such units the general power which works out social changes, and he will perceive that he may properly give full utterance to his innermost conviction, leaving it to produce what effect it may. It is not for nothing that he has in him these sympathies with some principles and repugnance to others. He, with all his capacities and aspirations and beliefs, is not an accident but a product of the time. He must remember that while he is a descendant of the past he is a parent of the future, and that his thoughts are as children born to him, which he may not carelessly let die. He, like every other man, may properly consider himself as one of the myriad agencies through whom works the Unknown Cause; and when the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain belief, he is thereby authorized to profess and act out that belief. For, to render in their highest sense the words of the poet:

> —Nature is made better by no mean,
> But nature makes that mean; over that art
> Which you say adds to nature, is an art
> That nature makes.

Not as adventitious, therefore, will the wise man regard the faith that is in him, The highest truth he sees he will fearlessly utter, knowing that, let what may come of it, he is thus playing his right part in the world—knowing that if he can effect the change he aims at—well; if not—well also; though not so well.

Does this dictum of Herbert Spencer jus-

tify the writer in publishing this book? He gives utterance herein to what he deems the highest truth, and he has set forth his innermost conviction. But are not the new truths which he enunciates his fuller justification? The book is itself his affirmative answer to the latter question. Every intelligent reader will coincide with him.

But more important than the writer's justification is the promulgation of Truth, and because this book presents new truths in lieu of ancient errors its publication needs no excuse or apology. And be it understood that the writer makes none. If any person, however, shall demand a reason for the demolition of two the most formidable misconceptions held by mankind, let that person contemplate, by mental prevision, the results likely to follow the general comprehension of the new concepts. If such prevision shall prove unsatisfactory the person's attention is then invited to the extract from Herbert Spencer's writings previously quoted. The captious reader is thus forestalled.

One result that will flow from the general apprehension of the new meaning of the word authority can be predicted with absolute certainty. The learned judges of the courts will no more refer to precedents as "authorities." Nor will editors, reporters

and other educated persons use the word "authorities" when referring to officials, for they will have learned that authority has no plural. What term shall be used when a person, now spoken of as "an authority," is referred to? The purists will have some matters to look after in this connection and are expected to lend their aid to the revision of the old concepts.

Anarchy and Socialism are twin evils of society. The one is a rabid mania and the other a mild quixotism. The devotees of the one would annihilate authority—an impossibility—while the advocates of the other would make authority subservient and subordinate—another impossibility—for it is supreme. The conviction of its absolute supremacy, and of the necessity of obeying its mandates are the creed and the chief doctrine of the Cult of Tertianation toward it. There must be also the recognition that, in the constituted order of things, Authority has the indispensable Right to employ Force upon those who refuse to render obeyance to its mandates.

The writer leaves it to those who are wiser than he to descant upon, elucidate and amplify the sociological scope and bearings of the new concepts and thus prepare them for adaptation to the needs of society.

CHICAGO, May 15, 1901.

THESIS I.

I. Tertianation: The Hitherto Unnamed Mental Faculty.

II. Religion: The Correct Concept, which has for its Basis the Exercise of Tertianation Toward and as Regards the Being Denominated God.

THESIS I.

I. TERTIANATION.

In his most famous work Carlyle says: "It is written, 'many shall run to and fro and knowledge shall be increased.' Surely the plain rule is: Let each considerate person have his way and see what it will lead to. For not this man and that man but all men make up mankind, and their united tasks the tasks of mankind. How often have we seen some such adventurous and much-ceusured wanderer light on some outlying, neglected, yet vitally momentcus province; the hidden treasures of which he first discovered and kept proclaiming until the general eye and effort were directed thither and the conquest was completed—thereby in these his seemingly endless rambles planting new standards, founding new colonies in the immeasurable circumambient realm of Nothingness and Night. Wise man was he who counseled that Speculation should have free

course and look fearlessly toward all the thirty-two points of the compass, whithersoever and howsoever it listed."

Speculation is the most facile process of the human mind. It has filled thousands of volumes with mere rubbish, and the futile work will continue to afflict mankind. Yet many a gem of knowledge has been discovered by it.

To speculate means primarily to make a speculum or mirror, and in its extended sense it means to make a mirror of one's mind; to look into this mirror and observe the reflections therein made; to bring them forth and set them down in written characters. Speculation has "looked fearlessly"—more fearlessly at the subject of this thesis than at any other thing in creation—and there has been more speculation about it than in regard to any other subject that has occupied the minds of men, yet, strange to say, the correct concept of its nature has never been set forth by any writer. The reason for this is that no person has ever conceived the true basis of religion, hence no one has been able to enunciate its correct concept; and hence also all persons form their own conceptions of it—no two of which are alike. From these causes the nature of religion has been misunderstood and a great

misconception has sprung up in regard to it. This consists of the idea that there exist a number of religions, while in fact the word has, properly speaking, no plural. It is the purpose of this thesis to expunge this erroneous idea—to eradicate it—to extirpate it by setting forth the true basis and the correct concept of the nature of religion. The allegations made will be in part sustained by the citation of sundry definitions of the word religion derived from various sources. The verity of the allegations in remaining part will then be fully demonstrated.

Definitions cited :—

In an article entitled : "Religion ; why so many Definitions of ?" published in the *Popular Science Monthly*, vol. 37, p. 348, the writer of it gives a number of definitions from a collection of sixty made by him. These are quoted in the order in which they appear :

"Religion is an *a priori* theory of the universe."—HERBERT SPENCER.

"Religion is a sense of dependence on something or some one not ourselves."—MAX MULLER.

"Religion is ethics hightened and lit up by emotion."—MATTHEW ARNOLD.

"Religion is a feeling of absolute dependence on something which though it determines us, we can in no sense determine."—SCHLEIERMACHER.

"Religion is a mere covetousness, which manifests itself in prayer sacrifice and faith." —FEUERBACH.

"Religion is a combination of absolute dependence and covetousness."—STRAUSS.

"Religion is perfect freedom, for it is nothing more nor less than the Divine Spirit becoming conscious of Himself through the finite spirit."—HEGEL.

"Religion is the human mind standing in reverence and inspiratiou before the infinite energy of the universe asking to be lifted up into it, opening itself to inspiration."—LUTHARDT,

"Religion is mere assent through the conscience to God."—MARTINEAU.

"Religion is the conception of divine or at least superhuman power entertained by men in moments of gratitude, need or distress, when, as Homer says, 'all folk yearn after the gods.'"—*Andrew Lang*.

"Religion is belief in some god or powers above on which we depend and who are interested in us; together with the feelings and practices resulting from such belief."—*Flint in "Theism."*

"Religion is a belief in a supernatural being or beings whose actions are seen in the works of creation, and of such relation on the part of man toward this being or [those] beings as to prompt the believer to acts of propitiation and worship and to the regulation of conduct."—PROF. WHITNEY.

"Religion has to do with the relation of the soul to God."—DE PRESSENSE.

"Religion is the bond between the science

of ethics and the science of theology."—PROF. PALMER.

The various dictionaries of the English language furnish other and diverse definitions of religion, some of which are quoted.

In Webster's Dictionary religion is defined to be :

I. The outward act or form by which men indicate their recognition of a god or gods having power over their destiny, to whom obedience, service and honor are due; the feeling or expression of human love, fear or awe of some superhuman or overruling power, whether by profession or of belief, by observance of rites and ceremonies, or by the conduct of life; a system of faith and worship; a manifestation of piety; as ethical religion; monotheistic religion; revealed religion; the religion of the Jews; the religion of idol worshippers.

II. Spcifically, conformity in faith and life to the precepts inculcated in the Bible respecting the conduct of life and duty toward God and man; the Christian faith and practice.

III. (R. C. Ch.) A monastic or religious order, subject to a regulated mode of life; the religious state; as, to enter religion. [R]

IV. Strictness or fidclity in conforming to any practice as if it were an enjoined rule of conduct.

The foregoing definition is somewhat ancient—good enougn in its day but it needs revision. The writer begs leave to recom-

mend to the future editors of Webster's Dictionary that, when they revise the definition of the word "religion," they will not overwork the semicolon.

In the Standard Dictionary religion is defined thus:

I. A belief binding the spiritual nature of man to a supernatural being on whom he is dependent; also the practice that springs out of the recognition of such relation including the personal life and experience, the doctrines, the duties and the rites founded on it.

II. Any system of faith and worship.

III. An essential part or a practical test of the spiritual life—the part being by synecdoche put for the whole (or sometimes mistaken for it.)

IV. Spiritual awakening and the conformity of heart and life to religious belief.

V. A state of life bound by monastic vows.

VI. Conscientious devotion in practice; scrupulous care.

VII. The rites or cult of a religion.

In the preceding definiton of religion the word has no less than seven meanings given to it. Perhaps it would be more eorrect to say that according to the definition the word is used in seven different senses. For, religion, it is stated, is a belief, a practice, a system, a test, an awakening, a state of life, and a cult. It stands to reason, therefore, that a word which has but one signification could

not have so many meanings—could not be assigned to express so many different ideas if there was not a general misconception of the thing itself.

In Worcester's Dictionary religion is defined as follows :

I. An acknowledgement of our obligatiou to God as our Creator with a feeling of reverence and love and consequent duty or obedience to him ; duty to God and his creatures ; practical piety ; godliness ; devotion ; holiness.

II. A Particular system of faith or worship.

III. (pl.) Religious rites.

And yet religion is none of these things.

The Encyclopædic Dictionary (Cassell & Co., London,) gives the following definition of religion :

I. Ordinary language (a) objectively(1.) The outer form and embodiment which the inward spirit of a true or false devotion assumed (Trench) ; a rite or ceremony practiced in the worship of God. (2.) A system of doctrine and worship regarded by its adherents as of divine authority. (b.) Subjectively : The feeling of veneration with which the worshiper regards the being whom he adores, specially the intense veneration the Christian has for the Trinity, with the moral results to which that veneration leads.

This is "confusion worse confounded." It is not surprising that a no-concept or a mis-concept prevails in regard to the nature

of religion when lexicographers become mere word-mongers.

In the matter of dictionaries the Century Dictionary leads the world. It is the ne plus ultra, the crown and flower of the nineteenth century. The new century has but just begun when it is discovered that some of the most important definitions contained in this thesaurus of the centuries already need revision. Witness this book.

The following definition of religion is from the Century Dictionary :

I. Recognition of and allegiance in manner of life to a superhuman power or powers to whom allegiance and service are regarded as justly due.

II. The healthful developement and right life as contrasted with that of the mere intellectual or social powers.

III. Any system of faith in and worship of a divine being or beings.

IV. The rites and services of religion ; the practice of sacred rites and ceremonies.

V. The state of life of a professed member of a monastic order.

VI. A conscientious scruple ; scrupulosity.

VII. Sense of obligation ; conscientiousness ; sense of duty.

This is a *fin de siecle* definition, truly. There is an evident intent to make it profound and original, but the effort has failed on both points, for, it follows the old lines. A remarkable and gracious catholicity is

manifested by admitting Christian Science and Ethics to be classed as "religions" under the respective designations of "healthful developement" (physical? of course,) and "right life." This is a novelty and a sort of word puzzle. Theosophy comes in as a "religion," also, under the third section of the definition.

A resume of these definitions quoted from the dictionaries shows that religion is a great variety of acts, thoughts and feelings—all having reference to a god or gods, to a supernatural being, to God the Creator, to God, to a superhuman power or powers and to a divine being or beings.

The acts performed are rites, ceremonies and observances; the thoughts engendered are those which spring from the belief of the doctrines taught; and the feelings aroused are love, awe and reverence. These things prompt the devotee to obey, to honor, to serve and to worship God; thereby recognising and acknowledgeing his relation to Him.

The rites and ceremonies are not religion, nor is the belief, nor love, awe aud reverence, nor piety, godliness, devotion and holiness. These things are not religion.

Nor is each system of faith and worship a distinct religion. Nor is it correct to say that a person who binds himself by monastic

vows "enters religion." He enters a monastery and binds himself by vows to devote his life to the practice of certain prescribed observances in pursuance of religion.

So the foregoing definitions out of the dictionaries are erroneous in part and in whole, for religion is not what it is therein set forth to be. They are here declared to be erroneous and in succeeding pages will be proved to be so.

The writer passed the summer of 1900 on the Pacific coast. While there he addressed, by mail and personally, to different persons —mostly clergymen, the question: "What is religion?"—asking in each case the individual conception of the nature of religion. A number of answers were received, some of which follow. It is interesting to note that while these answers are differently phrased yet they are nearly all based on the same fundamental ideas of the recognition of God, obligation to Him and duty to our fellowmen, but none of them defines religion correctly, nor are the definitions as exact as the requirements of lexigraphy demand.

The Answers

SEATTLE, June 7. Religion is the recognition by man of his relationship to a higher Being and of his duties and privileges resulting from this relationship.

FRANK PIERREPONT GRAVES,
Pres. Univ. Wash.

SEATTLE, June 9 The word religion in its broadest application signifies a belief in a dependent relation to a supernatural being or beings and the result of such a belief in the faith conduct and worship of the believer.

EDWIN M. RANDALL, Jr.
Pastor 3rd Ave. M. E. Church.

SEATTLE, June 11. Religion is man's belief in a supernatural Being or Beings and the attempt to shape his life in accordance with the revealed or understood will of the Divine Being or Beings.

LOUIS S. BOWERMAN,
Pastor 1st Bapt. Church.

SEATTLE, June 13. Religion *per se* is man's perception of his dependence upon the forces of the Universe (presumed to be guided by an intelligent author or authors) and man's desire for deliverance from such forces as he considers evil. Dependence and desire are the primal sources of religion.

W. D. SIMONDS,
Pastor Unit. Church.

PORTLAND, OR. June 22 Religion is an instinct peculiar to man alone. It is a responding of his soul to God. It is universal and becomes to every normal life the highest motive. True religion is that in which man has come to true relations to God.

WM. S. GILBERT,
Pastor Calv'y Presb. Church.

SEATTLE, June 23. The word religion is derived from the Latin *retigare* which signifies to bind. This etymology leads to the

idea of a reciprocal accord between God and man and thereby shows in its true light the true character of religion—the only one that can lead us to an exact conception of the idea conveyed by the word, viz:—that of a mysterious bond that unites man to the Divinity.

F. X. PREFONTAINE, S. J.

TACOMA, June 23. The term religion has come to be used interchangeably with Christianity. This is because in the tendency to abbreviate all that can be cut short we no longer speak of the Christian Religion (which is what we really mean,) but simply say "Religion." Religion *per se* may mean any form of worship, for the pagans and Mahommedans are often very religious and pious.

Like our nervous and often slangy use of anguage, sacred things may fall into a questionable use of words.

H. V. GEVLER,
Pastor 1st M. E. Church.

TACOMA, June 26. Religion is the apprehension by man of an invisible power or powers which binds on the soul the idea of ought or obligation, as reflected in all man's feelings, desires and actions.

In a word it may be expressed in this shorter sentence: True religion is the soul's feeling, desire and action bound to an obligation to do the whole will of God—the Creator.

J. LEWIS SMITH,
Pastor 1st Bapt. Church.

TACOMA, June 26. Religion—that native or intuitive belief which attaches the spiritual in man to a supreme spiritual being upon whom he is dependent and whose interest and authority he confesses by various acts of worship and works.

Secondarily, religion is the result of such a belief upon the life experience of the devotee, in view of his confessed relation to the supreme being, whose governmental rights beget corresponding duties. As there can be but one supreme being it follows that there is but one true religion.

JOSEPH R. MONFORT,
Pastor Immanuel Pres. Church.

ABERDEEN, Wash., June 28. Religion is the sum of those interior and exterior acts, whereby man honors God as the Infinite Majesty; willingly submits to and obeys His law, the expression of the will of his Supreme Lord and Master; and loves Him as the Being infinitely good from whom all good comes.

Religion presupposes therefore (and rests as on its foundation upon) the recognition of God's inalienable and just rights over man, whereby the latter feels himself bound (and a sense of justice lives in every even the pagan's heart) to give evidence to his dependence and God's rights by his life.—Hence (from *religare*, to bind) religion is the living expression of that bond which exists between the creator and the creature endowed with intellect and free-will.

REV. W. J. METZ, LL. B.

ABERDEEN, Wash., June 30. By religion I understand the recognition of human obligation to God and man and the practice of those duties which grow out of the recognition of relationship to him and to one another.

HALBERT D. CRAWFORD,
Pastor Cong. and Pres. Churches.

COHASSET BEACH, Wash., July 13. Religion means "Bound to God." The Church with the Sacraments, the Creeds, the Ministry and the Bible are bands. Mercy and Truth, Righteousness and Love are other bands which bind us to God.

LEMUEL H. WELLS,
Bishop E. Diocese of Wash.

COHASSET BEACH, Wash., July 20. I should define "Religion" as the result of man's attempt to formulate the relation between himself and life as a whole.

MRS. L. H. WALL.

SEATTLE, Sept. 6. Religion is a word of various meanings, now restricted, now vague and cannot be properly defined as cheese or fruit might be in the compass of a postal card. In general I would consider it as the recognition of the obligation of the individual to the past and the present.

A. F. BECHDOLT,
Prof. Lit. Univ. Wash.

SEATTLE, Sept. 22. Religion is broader than any church or creed. It implies no particular mode of worship or form of belief. It stands for the highest and most enduring interests of the individual and the race. It is

the aspiration for a nobler and better life.

J. ALLEN SMITH,
Prof. Univ. of Wash.

ABERDEEN, Wash., Oct. 6. Religion—that bond or band which holds us in subjection to a power which we believe is more potent for good or evil than we ourselves are. In the pagan, Pantheon; in the Jew, Jehovah; in the Christian, the Trinity, etc.

CHAS. McDERMOTH,
Pastor M. E. Church.

SEATTLE, Oct. 25. Religion in its broadest acceptance is simply man conscious of God and dependent upon Him. Creeds and theologies, mystic experiences and sacrificial systems and all our efforts to find a rational interpretation of life and history are the fruit of a tree whose tap root is the conviction of the existence of God.

J. P. D. LLWYD,
Rector of St. Mark's Church.

In this symposium on religion we have three series of definitions of the word. The first series is by men of genius or men whose minds are supra-ordinary; thc second, from the dictionaries, was written by careful, studious and laborious scholars who may be termed men of extraordinary minds and in the third we have definitions from men of ordinary minds. The authors of the latter will, however, not be likely to admit "this soft impeachment." But although the authors of the various definitons quoted are per-

sons of different intellectual powers, in this category, they rank alike; for, their definitions are alike erroneous—none of them expressing the correct concept. The reason for the numerous and various misconceptions of religion extant in the world, in the minds of men and in books, is that its true basis has not, hitherto, been named. The writer has undertaken the task of elucidating the subject. He will make it clear that religion is one thing—a single concept, and not many; he will explain its true basis and will define it in such terms as will leave no doubt as to its meaning.

The Scotch poet, Robert Burns, concludes one of his celebrated poems with the familiar lines:

> O, wad some power the giftie gie us,
> To see oorselves as ithers see us,
> It wad fræ mony a blunder free us
> And foolish notion.

The allusion in the lines is to the old-time fancy that at birth each child was visited by its fairy god-fathers and god mothers, who bestowed upon it such "gifties," in the way of mental endowments and physical graces, as they felt inclined by their love of the parents to confer. In our language each gift, each faculty and each quality has a name, but the gift or faculty that enables us "to

see oorselves as ithers see us" has thus far received no distinct appellation. True, it has been denoted by the phrase—"Detachment of the intellect," but that is awkward, non-expressive and has obtained no vogue. That there is a mental faculty such as the poet's words indicate is an indubitable fact. The poet divined its existence and some callow scribbler tried to stigmatize it by a phrase which gave no clue to the mental operations performed or to the particular faculty employed. Then, though its existence was divined by the poet and an attempt was made to fasten upon it an absurd name it remains, to this day, without a specific designation. Since the writer is to stand as sponsor for the proper naming of this hitherto unnamed mental faculty, it behooves him to name it properly.

The faculty itself can be evolved logically and its designation will follow as a natural result of the evolution. The story of the encounter between Balaam and his Ass and the Angel will supply the situation from which the faculty and its name will be evolved.

Parenthetically it may be remarked that there are a great many intelligent persons in the world who believe that the Ass did literally open her mouth and address her master after the manner of human beings, using for

the occasion human language and human thoughts and human reason. At the same time there are a few persons, comparatively speaking, who, as the result of what is termed "The Higher Criticism," have come to regard the story of Balaam as a myth and as an interpolation having no connection with the historical narrative.

It is proper for the writer to state that he holds neither with the many nor with the few, and that he has no controversy either with those who believe the story to be true or with those who deny its verity. The story is there ; it has been current for ages ; it is at our hand and for the purposes of an illustration it must be deemed to be literally true. The personages of the story were real personages. The Angel was a real angel, Balaam was a real prophet and the Ass was a real ass and noue the less a personage for being an ass, because she spoke in human language and showed herself to be better bred than her master. The story must be so considered in order that the important truths which it contains may be evolved for our enlightenment and instruction.

At first we have two personages of the story—the Ass and her master—the latter riding upon the back of the former, when the third personage appears, with a drawn

sword in his hand and obstructs the road. The Ass, wiser than her master, having a keener spiritual vision, saw the Angel, and acting just like any ass would, turned aside. When the Angel withstood the travelers a second time in the road, with a wall on both sides, the Ass acted again just like any ass would and thrust herself unto the wall and crushed her master's foot against the wall. At the third encounter with the adversary the Ass acted just like any ass would and laid down upon the ground and, having been beaten again, she opened her mouth and expostulated with her master on account of the three beatings. This was a very unusual proceeding on the part of this particular ass, though it does not appear to have surprised Balaam. Presumably the Ass spoke good Chaldean, having been reared in a family which spoke that language, but she acted throughout like a well bred ass, notwithstanding the frequent beatings.

The situation is this: In the three meetings with the Angel by Balaam and his Ass the Angel was the third party and the Ass was able by her more acute perceptions, not only to see the Angel standing in the way and brandishing his flaming sword, but she could perceive how herself appeared in the Angel's eyes, that is, she could see herself as

another and that other the third party saw her. In order to accomplish this effectively it was necessary for her, by a mental process to become or make herself the tertian party —in a word to *tertianate*. The primary meaning of the word is to become or make oneself the third party, and in its extended sense it is intended to convey the idea contained in the poet's phrase of "seeing oorselves as ithers see us." In that sense then to tertianate means *to divine the views, opinions, thoughts and feelings or mental attitudes of others concerning or toward oneself.* The process by which this is accomplished is a mental or psychological one, but appears on the face of it to partake of the nature of the occult, as though the act were a projection of the mind or a detachment of the intellect. As a matter of fact the operation results from the exercise of the hitherto unnamed mental faculty, which, appropriately enough, may be termed : *Tertianation*—the mental faculty by the exercise of which one is enabled to tertianate.

Is tertianation a special faculty of the mind? Its existence was divined by the poet as a "giftie;" an unsuccessful attempt has been made to designate it; and now the writer gives it "a local habitation and a name." If this is not enough it can be de-

monstrated that the workings of the newly named mental faculty pervade all the relations of human society.

Of course its exercise is aided by those mental faculties which we term the imagination and the judgement and the person who is most highly endowed in these particulars, will, other things being equal (*cæteris paribus*,) be most largely gifted with the ability to tertianate, and vice versa, those who are least endowed in these regards will exhibit a lack of the faculty in question. In everyday life the persons who are deficient in imagination and judgement often conduct themselves in some absurd or erratic manner and the common opinion of such persons is that they are fools. In reality they lack tertianation, for if they could see themselves as others saw them they would act neither preposterously, nor contrary to the abiding force of convention and custom, nor contrary to the dictates of conscience, nor contrary to the mandates of authority.

Persons may tertianate as to themselves. Thus, they may be tempted to do acts which they know would be dishonorable. They know that if they shall do the acts they will be regarded by society as dishonorable persons. But if they can tertianate as to themselves; if they have the ability to step, as it

were, outside of themselves and view the contemplated acts as they appear to their intellectual parts standing in the relation of third parties to the moral and physical parts of their natures; if they are able to ask themselves: "How do we appear in our own eyes as the doers of such deeds?" and are able to see themselves from the objective view-point, by the exercise of tertianation, they can appreciate the fact that the acts which they have proposed to themselves are reprehensible and are thus saved from the perpetration of dishonorable deeds.

Innumerable instances might be cited to show the workings of tertianation, but a few must suffice.

Abraham Lincoln, in all probability, was gifted with the faculty of tertianation in larger measure than any man that ever lived. It was his highest endowment and constituted the chief element of his character—the essential quality of his greatness. It was the ruling faculty of his life—in the affairs that were the most momentous as well as in those that were trivial.

On one occasion, during the civil war, it was most important that he should consult the General of the army and he went, for the purpose, to that officer's house in Washington. The servant who opened the door in-

formed the President that the General was absent—attending a ball, in fact. Lincoln entered the house and said he would await the General's return. He waited—the great Lincoln waited—pressed by cares of office, pondering over weighty affairs, he waited until long past midnight to consult the General of the army. He heard the General arrive in his carriage, heard him ascend the stairs and all was quiet again. He summoned the servant, who told him that the General had been apprised that the President was waiting, had been waiting a long time to see him, and, the servant added :—"The General has retired and refuses to see you to-night." The President then returned to the White House. The name of the General was McClellan. The President could tertianate ; the General could not.

On another occasion Lincoln, as attorney, brought suit for a client on a note given by two young men, while minors, for some oxen and a plough. When the boys came into their inheritance on attaining their majority, they refused to pay the note on the ground that an obligation incurred during non-age is not collectable—being instigated to this course by their attorney. At the trial of the case, Lincoln arose and, addressing the Court, said : " 'He who steals my purse

steals trash, but he who robs me of my good name takes that which profiteth him nothing and makes me poor indeed.'" "These boys," he continued, "are honest and would have paid this note had not the rascally attorneys got hold of them. But now, unless they pay this note they will enter upon their young manhood handicapped by a dishonest transaction." Then he sat down. The boys were seen to consult together for a few moments and then the oldest announced that they would pay the note. Lincoln's words enabled them to see themselves as an honest man saw them; enabled them to tertianate as regards others, their fellow-men.

The following incident shows clearly how a child may tertianate toward a parent: A boy of ten years was charged with a great wrong by a neighbor, who brought the matter to the notice of his parents. The sensitive boy was so shocked and stupefied that he could say nothing and the blush of shame that flushed his face was conclusive evidence of guilt to the father, who thought his son should be punished at once; but the mother thought differently and the boy was dismissed to think the matter over. Later in the evening the boy was missing and the mother stepping to the end of the veranda heard the sound of sobbing in the bushes at

the lower end of the garden. She went nearer and heard the agonizing prayer: "O Lord, you know I didn't do it and somehow make my mother know it or I shall die." The mother retraced her steps, rather than seem to intrude and shortly after softly called him by name. Bravely he replied, "I'm coming mother." He was about to retire to his room when his mother said to him, "Don't trouble about that affair to-day. The Lord knows and mother knows that her boy would be ashamed to do so mean an act." His lower lip was trembling, but his face and words were steady as he said: "I don't care what others say, but I couldn't bear to know that you thought meanly of me."

A most notable instance of learning how "ithers saw" him, and thence of acquiring the ability to see himself from the same view-point, occurred in the case of an alderman of this city, a few years ago. An ordinance had been introduced into the city council granting a fifty-year franchise to a street railway company, and a large sum of money had been placed to insure the passage of the measure. A certain number of the aldermen were known to have been bought, and the air of the council chamber fairly reeked with "boodle." The newspapers

ventilated the matter thoroughly and gave the names of the aldermen and the share of "boodle" each would receive. The name of this particular alderman was in the list of those who were known to be only too willing to be bribed. He had a son who was attending school in another state, and the news that this boy's father belonged to the gang of "boodlers" in the Chicago council was not long in reaching the school. Many of the students thought they could show their detestation of crime by manifesting their dislike of the reputed criminal in acts that were odious to his son. They jeered him, they sneered at him and in every way made the situation unendurable to him. The son wrote to his father detailing the treatment he received from his fellow-students on account of his father being a reputed boodler. The son begged his father not to be guilty of the infamous crime of accepting a bribe, and said unless a promise was given to that effect he would be compelled to withdraw from the school on account of the disgrace which would be brought upon him by his father's iniquitous conduct. The alderman's wife added her tears and her entreaties to her son's appeal, and to these influences the wise counsels of honest friends were joined. The result was that the alderman learned to

see himself as others saw him; acquired the ability to tertianate toward his wife, his son, his friends and finally toward Authority and was thus saved from the committal of an infamous crime.

Tertianation is a gift. Most persons are endowed with it in greater or less degree. A few lack the faculty entirely. These are the unconventional, the erratic and the criminal. When the faculty shall be cultivated toward the various relations of life there will be fewer fools and unconscionable rascals in the world.

The faculty controls the "self" qualities and is predominant in the use of tact and and discretion.

The excessive exercise of tertianation in any one direction induces mania.

The faculty controls the actions of children toward their parents; governs the conduct of men in their relations with their fellows; restrains from deeds of violence and crime in respect to Authority and rules the lives of nearly all persons as regards God.

It seems strange, indeed, that a mental faculty, which exerts so powerful and controlling an influence over social relations, has not hitherto been recognised by psychologists. To them the writer presents this newly-born faculty of the mind, which, in

one relation or another is the saving grace of human society, with the request that they will study it and explain its affinities and its limitations. The lexicographers are especially requested to define the term and its connates *correctly*.

II. RELIGION.

Referring to the story which furnished the realization of the hitherto unnamed mental faculty it will be found to supply the subject for the exposition of the correct concept of religion.

Balaam stands in the picture as a priest, because he performed sacrifice; as a mediator between man and divinity; as the expounder of God's will to men. Thus he officiated at the altar, he was necessary for intercourse with God and he was divinely set apart to preach righteousness. In these things he was not different from the priest or minister of the present time. He accepted recompense for his service as a prophet or the reward bestowed upon the diviner—such being his real profession, for, he went into a trance, as he says in one place and he repeats the statement in another place, having his eyes open and saw visions. And in these things he was not different from the preachers of to-day. They receive remuner-

ation for their services, and though none of them fall into a catalepsy yet many of them, having their eyes open, see visions as Balaam did. In all these things his functions were the same as those performed by the priests and ministers of the present day. But the rites and ceremonies and sacrifices were different, thongh they were performed for the same purpose—with the same end in view—as are the purpose and the end to which all the observances of the church of to-day are directed. His knowledge of and belief in God were the same as those which are inculcated in a general way now. He appears on the page of history as the representative, the exponent, the embodiment of religion—the religion of his day—which, as far as the function of its prophet and the object of its practices and observances are concerned, was the same as that of the present age. That is, religion, in its essential nature, is the same now as it was in the days of Balaam and in the period extending back long prior to the epoch in which he lived. In fact it is "the same yesterday, to-day and forever." The *same*, always the *same*. Yet when the question is asked—What is religion?—a question to which there is but one answer—many answers in diverse phraseology are obtained. To a thousand or to ten thousand persons

the query might be propounded and each would give a different answer; each would formulate and phrase a definition different from that of every other one of the ten thousand persons, Yet Max Muller, one of the profoundest scholars of this age, said in one of his latest articles that "religion is one thing." Hence it should have, as the requirements of lexigraphy demand, one definition that defines it and not ten thousand definitions which do not define it.

Religion is subjective and takes cognizance of all the acts done by men with regard to God and all the feelings entertained by them toward God. The acts done are the work of the intellect and the emotions are experienced by the soul. Religious acts and religious emotions relate to God alone and therefore religion does not include duties to men. These are prescribed by morality, the principles of which religion inculcates because such teaching is an act done with regard to God—done because it is supposed to be agreeable to God. Religion and morality are distinct and separate and each delimits its own sphere. Religion has reference to God alone, while morality lays down rules for the conduct of men, as social beings, in their relation to each other. Yet there are those who make of morality, what, by an

inaccurate and a mistaken use of terms they call a religion. Thus we find the great agnostic, Prof. Huxley, defining what he considers to be religion in the following language :—"That a man should determine to devote himself to the services of humanity, including intellectual and moral self-culture under that name ; that this should be, in the proper sense of the word his religion, is, I think, not only an intelligible proposition but a laudable resolution. And I am greatly disposed to believe that it is the only religion which will prove itself unassailably acceptable so long as the world endures—a religion which means, as I think it ought to mean, simply the reverence and love for the ethical ideal and the desire to realize that ideal in life which every person ought to feel."

"Services of humanity!" and "ethical ideal!" in "the proper sense of the word" —religion! Prof. Huxley was a master of the English language and used its terms with great exactness, but when he says that the ethical ideal, as expressed in the Golden Rule, and devotion to the service of humanity are religion he mis-applies the term. Recognition of God is absolutely essential to religion. What Prof. Huxley terms religion is morality pure and simple.

Man is a religious being, that is, he performs the duties enjoined by religion and these have reference to God only. Man is also a moral being, that is, he performs the duties imposed by morality and these relate to his fellow-men. Recognition of God is the essence of religion. Morality does not recognise God, herefore it cannot be termed religion in any sense, proper or otherwise. Ethics, as the morals of refined persons has been esthetically designated cannot rank as religion, therefore, Prof. Huxley and the Century Dictionary to the contrary notwithstanding. Ethics must take a back seat and be relegated among the cults. Even at that the ethical ideal is impossible of realization, for the one who first attempted it was in the end crucified, and in our day Tolstoi, who is following in his footsteps, is regarded as an impracticable.

In this connection it seems proper to refer to conceptions of the nature of God entertained by mankind. Theology—a term that means literally the science of God—has taken the measure of God and knows all his attributes. Theologians, some of them, at least, are as familiar with God as though he were a neighbor living next door. They are deep in his counsels ; they know his designs, his pnrposes and intentions in the manage-

ment of the affairs of this world, even before they are declared by the Almighty, or before the event, by a prevision that amounts to prophecy. They are ready to point out instances in which God's work could be improved and to indicate other instances in which he could not have done otherwise than he did, thus placing him under the rule of absolute necessity. They represent God as a being who possesses infinite power, as a being to be propitiated by worship and sacrifice. They have systematized their beliefs and ideas concerning the God whom they worship and whom they instruct their followers to love, reverence and adore, and the system they have termed Theology. But the God which the theologians set forth is not the God worshiped by any human being, for every devotee formulates his or her own idea of God.

All persons of intelligence know that the limitations of science are so narrow that it is impossible to fathom the Infinite Spirit. Science does not and can not deny the existence of a Creator, and the long convergent lines of scientific thought reach out to some far-off focus in which the great First Cause dwells; but to pure science the nature of this original central force or being must forever remain unknown and unknowable.

Man is a conscious being and science knows consciousness only as an attribute of matter. To religious faith, however, it is given to apprehend consciousness as an abstraction—consciousness self-existent and eternal, unclothed from material form, but clothed with attributes of power and goodness that are infinite—consciousness that is God. This is the God that every devotee of every creed or form of belief worships. Be they Christians or Jews or Mahommedans or Buddhists or Pagans, they all worship the same God—for there is but one. They may erect idols or set up images, but they do not worship these concrete forms, but the being these represent—an abstraction, a consciousness self-existent and eternal, unclothed from material form, but clothed with attributes of power and goodness that are infinite; consciousness that is God. This is the God whom all men worship. This is the God for whose approbation all religious acts are done, all religious practices and observances are designed, all religious creeds and doctrines are formulated. The end, aim and object of all religious acts, rites, ceremonies, practices, observances, creeds and doctrines is the benefit of man's soul here and hereafter. The religious devotee worships God with prayer and praise; conciliates him by acts of

sacrifice, propitiates him by performing certain rites and ceremonies, by complying with certain practices and observances and by believing certain creeds and doctrines; and he does these things because he has been taught that by doing them he will meet God's approbation and benefit his own soul. And in order to be satisfied that his daily life is approved by God, that his soul is clean and pure in the sight of God, he must see his soul as God sees it. That is, as between God as the third person in relation to himself and his soul, he must make himself or become the third person in order to view his soul as God views it—in a word he must tertianate toward and as regards God concerning his soul; therefore:—

Religion is the exercise of tertianation toward and as regards the being denominated God, by those who worship him, and in pursuance of which worship they perform certain acts of religious sacrifice and certain religious rites and ceremonies; comply with certain religious observances and practices and believe certain religious doctrines, and they do these things for the reason that they have been taught that by so doing they will receive the approbation of God and benefit their own souls.

To this definition may be subjoined a supplement in the following words:—

This is what religion is, whether of Jew or Gentile, Christian or Mahommedan, Buddhist or Heathen, or of the follower of any system, creed, sect or denomination which has for its chief tenet the worship of the Supreme Being. The religion of each is one and the same thing. Each performs different rites and ceremonies; each complies with different practices and observances and each believes different creeds and doctrines, but all are designed for the same purpose—to oblige the devotee to perform religious duties. Religion influences mankind to acts of morality; it is the same yesterday, to-day and forever and as such it will continue to prove itself unassailably acceptable to mankind, for, in the nature of things no substitute can be devised for it.

NOTE TO THESIS I.

PROF. HUXLEY'S "RELIGION."

On page 31 of Thesis I. is an extract from Prof. Huxley's article on "Agnosticism," in which he gives his idea of what he terms religion, and he declares it to be suitable for "every person." The writer has commented on the idea in that connection and has shown that what Prof. Huxley termed "religion" is morality.

It is somewhat remarkable that he has not stated, in unmistakeable language, in any of his writings, that "his religion" conformed to certain lines of thought and rules of conduct. Doubtless he deemed a declaration of individual beliefs unnecessary in view of the fact that his life "was known and read of all men," and the tenets of his faith and the canons of his cult were scattered through his controversial writings. So he formulated no creed for himself bnt lived it.

If, however, there is any formula of belief expressed anywhere in his writings it is in the quotation given on page 31. He does not say: "this is my religion," but he does say in effect that morality is "a religion" good enough for any person; for himself as well as another. There can be no doubt that he meant to make, in the words quoted, a

declaration of his own "religious" principles, of the ruling motives of his life. He was the living exponent of those principles, their propounder, their examplar and their active apostle. But there are other views.

On page 79 of his book on "Agnosticism and Religion" Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University, makes the following reference to Professor Huxley's "religion":

Once and, so far as I know, once only Huxley gives us his own positive conception of religion. It is in the essay on "Genesis *versus* Nature." He first quotes the verse from Micah:—"And what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God"; and then he adds to this statement: "If any so-called religion takes away from this great saying of Micah, I think it wantonly mutilates, while, if it adds thereto, I think it obscures the perfect ideal of religion."

If this was Huxley's own religion—and that I take to be the meaning of the passage———

How easy it is to be mistaken. In view of what precedes the extract from Dr. Schurman's book, it is plain that he is mistaken, when he states that Prof. Huxley's meaning is that the verse from Micah embodies "his own religion." The words of Micah mean that to practice morality and to worship God

is what God requires of man; and these are the chief duties of religion, the perfect ideal of religion. However, ideals change.

Dr. Schurman assumes that Prof. Huxley meant that the words of Micah presented the ideal of his "own religion," an assumption which his whole life contradicts. It seems clear therefore that Prof. Huxley referred to the general ideal of religion. The opinion of Dr. Schurman is fully controverted by the quotation on page 31, and with which he seems not to be familiar.

There can be no controversy on the point raised. In the proper sense of the word Prof. Huxley was not a religious man; he was of the cult of morality and "after the straitest sect."

THESIS II.

I. Authority: the Accepted Concept.

II. Authoity: the Correct Concept.

I. AUTHORITY: THE ACCEPTED CONCEPT.

Authority is the supremest thing on earth. By its exercise all the governmental functions of all the nations of the world are directed. All persons, in their different spheres, and their affairs are controlled by it, in some way or other during the whole of their lives, from birth and even before that event until death and even afterward. Yet mankind never has had and does not now have the correct concept of the nature of authority.

In the capital of a great country two men are riding in an open carriage. They are attended by all the circumstance of power and exalted station. Expectation of an impending change in their relative positions rests upon their countenances. The one is the President of the United States and the other is a private citizen and they are about to change places. They proceed to the appointed locality, and there, in the presence

of an assembled multitude, they stand with heads uncovered. An oath is the only ceremony. The hand of time deprives the one of something and endows the other with the same thing. The change is effected in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye. The one has shrunk—not visibly—for physically he is in all respects the same, but to the spiritual perceptions, not only of the vast assemblage but of all people he has diminished by the compass of that of which he has been bereft. The other has increased, not in stature, nor yet in size, but there is a new light in his eye, an unaccustomed tone in his voice and an added dignity to his bearing. He has been enlarged by an accretion that is invisible and intangible and yet it is plainly, nay, vociferously recognised by the concourse of people. The one, by the limit of time, has been divested of something, and the other, by the inception of a period of time, has been invested with the same thing; and this thing is termed Authority.

What then is this thing termed Authority?

The writer declares that the accepted conception of the nature of authority is an erroneous one ; and he proposes to demonstrate that a word which has been in immemorial use, its meaning definitely fixed, the conception it embodies universally adopted, has

an altogether different meaning from those which attach to it now and expresses a concept totally unlike the idea it is understood to convey.

The word authority is variously defined in the dictionaries and no two definitions are alike as will be found by comparing them.

In Webster's Dictionary authority is defined as follows:

I. Legal or rightful power; a right to commannd or to act; power exercised by a person in virtue of his office or trust; dominion; jurisdiction; authorization; as the authority of a prince over subjects and of parents over children; the authority of a court.

II. Government; the persons or the body exercising power or command; as the local *authorities* of the States; the military *authorities*, [chiefly in the plural.]

III. The power derived from opinion, respect or esteem; influence of character, office station or mental or moral superiority and the like; claim to be believed or obeyed; as an historian of no authority; a magistrate of great authority.

IV. That which or one who is appealed to in support of opinions, actions, measures, etc. Hence, (a) Testimony, witness. (b) A precedent; a decision of a court, an official declaration or an opinion, saying or statement worthy to be taken as a precedent. (c) A book containing such a statement or opinion or the author of the book. (d) Justification, warrant.

The Standard Dictionary gives the following definition of authority;

I. The right to command and enforce obedience [obeyance]; the right to act by virtue of office, station or relation; as, the authority of the parent over the child; the authority of an officer.

II. The power derived from intellectual or moral superiority, from reputation or from whatever else commands influence, respect or esteem; as, the authority of wisdom.

III. The person or company of persons in whom government is vested; as, the civil authorities.

IV. That which may be appealed to in support of action or opinion; as, a scientist, an author, a volume, statement, witness, document, etc; as, he is an authority on nervous disease; the book is authority on church history; this commission is my authority.

(An authority in any department of thought is one who has special opportunities of acquaintance with that department, has shown special ability and mastery in it and is free from prejudices. An argument from authority is based upon the statements of others concerning matters of opinion which they have reached by rational process and is to be distinguished from testimony which consists of the statements of others concerning matters of fact.)

V. Law. (1) The power delegated by a principal to his agent. (2) Rights exercised by a person in virtue of his office or position of public trust. (3) The obligation arising from and sustained by law; as, the authority

of the constitution. (4) Judicial decisions; official opinions or the writings of jurists of recognised ability; a precedent.

Synonyms: Ascendency, commission, dominion, influence, permission.

In Worcester's Dictionary authority is defined as follows:

I. Legal or genuine power; sovereign or established government; dominion.

II. Agents of established governments; as, the civil authorities.

III. Rule, sway, ascendency, or influence from superiority of endowment or condition.

IV. Delegated power.

V. A witness; a person or writing that offers corroborating evidence.

VI. Cogency of evidence; weight of testimony.

VII. A precedent or an act or decision worthy to be followed as a precedent.

Synonyms: Authority of a prince—sovereignty of the constitution, of the laws, of the people—dominion of an empire—rule of a monarch—sway of an orator over the multitude by the influence of his abilities—authority to compel—influence to persuade.

The Encyclopædic Dictionary defines authority to be;

A. *In an abstract sense*: The right of claiming belief and deference or of demanding obedience [obeyance.]

I. Of belief or deference.

1. Claimed on behalf of persons. (a) *Legitimately*: The right which a truthful person has of claiming belief in his testimony

on matters of fact which have fallen under his immediate cognizance; also the right which a man of intellect, knowledge and character posseses of claiming deference to his opinions even if they cannot be accepted. (b) Illegitimately: A claim to belief or deference not sustained by proper evidence.

2. Claimed on behalf of things: The title which a book or a document has to a greater or lesser amount of credit according to its character,

II. Of obedience [obeyance:] 1. Claimed on behalf of persons. (a) The right to demand obedience (may be founded on natural law, as, the authority of a parent over his children; or on the law of the country; as, that of a magistrate over those brought before him; or of a master over an apprentice.) Delegated power given by superiors. (b) Assumption that such a claim has been acknowledged; bold exercise of power. (c) Power resting on the actual acknowledgement of the claim made to it.

B. *In a concrete sense.* The persons for whom or the things for which belief, deference or obedience is claimed.

I. Of persons. 1. Of persons legitimately or illegitimately claiming belief or deference. 2. Of persons claiming obedience, viewed as individuals, or regarded collectively as one. In the former case the word is in the plural—"the military authorities," "the civil authorities," "the ecclesiastical authorities," or simply "the authorities,"—in the latter it is in the singular as in the abstract word "authority."

II. Of things (specially): Books or documents regarded as so deserving of credit that people in general are afraid to dissent from them in opinion.

In Murray's New English Dictionary the word–authority–is defined to be:

I. Power to enforce obedience. 1. Power or right to enforce obedience; moral or legal supremacy; the right to command or give an ultimate decision. (b) In authority; in a position of power.

2. Derived or delegated power; conferred right or title, authorization. (b) with *inf.* [probably meant for–inferiors–] Conferred right to do something.

3. Those in authority; the body or persons exercising power or command. (Formerly in *sing.*=Government; now usually abstract in *sing.*, concrete in *pl.*; a Local Sanitary Authority or similar body is also spoken of as 'the authority.')

II. Power to enforce action, opinion, belief.

4. Power to influence the conduct and actions of others; personal or practical influence.

5. Power over or title to influence the opinions of others; authoritative opinion; weight of judgement or opinion; intellectual influence.

6. Power to inspire belief; title to be believed; authoritative statement. Sometimes weakened to–authorship, testimony.

7. The quotation or book acknowledged or alleged to settle a question of opinion or give conclusive testimony.

8. (a) The person whose opinion or testimony is accepted; the author of an accepted statement. (b) One whose opinion on or upon a subject is entitled to be accepted-an expert in any question.

In the Century Dictionary-authority-is defined as follows:—

1. Power or admitted right to command or to act, whether original or delegated—as, the authority of a prince over subjects and of parents over children—the authority of an agent to act for his principal.

2. The power derived from opinion, or respect or long-established reputation—influence conferred by character, office, station, mental superiority or the like—credit—as, the authority of age or example—the authority of Aristotle.

3. Power in a general sense.

4. A person or persons or a body exercising power or command—generally in the plural—as, the civil and military authorities.

5. The outward marks of authority—especially the expression of authority in the countenance.

6. That to which or one to whom an appeal or reference may be made in support of any opinion, action or course of conduct—(a) Testimony—witness—that which or one who testifies. (b) Weight of testimony—credibility. (c) One who possesses adequate knowledge of a subject and whose opinions or statements may be relied on—an expert—a standard author or his writings. (d) In law, a precedent—a judicial decision—an official declaration or opinion such as ought

to be followed in similar cases. (e) Justification—countenance—warrant.

Synonyms: Rule, dominion, government, warrant, permission, authorization. 2. Influence, authority, ascendancy, control, sway, domination.

The foregoing definitions from different dictionaries of the English language give "The Accepted Concept" of the term "Authority," but they do not define the word correctly. That is, they do not embody and set forth "The Correct Concept" of the nature of -Authority- This is exact and definite and there is nothing of exactness or definiteness in these definitions. They set forth something which -Authority- is *not*. It is none of the things which these definistate that it is; and none of the words given as its synonyms has a meaning anything like what authority really and actually is. It has but one synonyn, a most excellent word, coined by the writer, which will be given further along in these pages.

It is simply impossible to obtain a clear or a correct idea of the nature of authority from these definitions. No two of them are alike in phraseology. Some of them are about as clear as mud and would be amusing if they were not so pitiably stupid and absurd. They show only a blind and feeble groping after the truth.

Authority, like religion, is one thing and can be defined but in one way. Usage and feebleness of intellect are accountable for the fact that so many and such diverse meanings have been assigned to a word which has, in truth, but one signification.

It is useless to analyze these definitions, for they are to be wiped out. The writer derives much satisfaction from this fact.

They are presented here for purposes of comparison—the one with the other—each with all and finally with the definition formulated by the writer, which will set forth the correct concept of the nature of authority.

When the light of this new definition dawns upon the minds of men they will perceive that the old definitions are incorrect and tnat the new one embodies the Correct Concept.

Reduced to the simplest terms the definitions quoted mean that authority is:

I. Power.

II. Example

III. Character.

IV. Testimony or Witness.

V. Precedent.

That is, the definitions state that cach of these five things taken singly *is* authority. In addition certain persons and things are stated to be–authorities– Correctly speaking

however authority has no plural and the use of the word in that number is, therefore, an inelegancy of diction—a mere colloquialism, which, though long sanctioned by custom, will not be tolerated when the correct concept of authority becomes generally known.

Power. The first section of the condensed definition signifies that power in a general sense is authority. If then we can ascertain the meaning of the word "power" we can come at the meaning of authority.

In his essay on "Power and Liberty," Tolstoi says: "Power is the will of the masses avowedly or tacitly transmitted to the rulers by the masses." Evidently he had the idea of authority in his mind, and the proof is that in another place he, forgetful of this previously written phrase, says: "Power is power. Power is a word the meaning of which we are entirely unable to understand." That is it is an abstract term which cannot be defined.

There is a common saying that "knowledge is power," and the meaning is that knowledge of various kinds enables its possessor to obtain positions where he can exert a personal power which is of the nature of influence. In like manner it may be said that authority is power in that its possession enables a person to exert power. Knowl-

edge is a personal possession; authority is an impersonal one, a thing entrusted. Knowledge is the source of the power it exerts and therefore it is not power itself. So also authority is the source of the power exerted by its possessor and therefore it is not itself power. Power cannot then be authority for it is derived from authority. It is latent and remains so until the exercise of authority causes its manifestation which results in action.

Two instances of authority are given to illustrate the definitions and as though each instance cited exhibited a different kind of authority: that of a prince over subjects, and of parents over children. To these Webster adds a third: that of a court. It is amusing to note, parenthetically, that the "Century" cites at this day the ancient instance of "a prince over subjects," when every person of intelligence knows that princes have not even the shadow of authority over subjects. In reality, however, the difference exists only in the persons over whom authority is exercised; for the authority is one and the same thing in each case. There are, as a matter of course, different functions performed by persons endowed with authority, and this difference is distinctive of the functions only. The prince—supposing him to

rule—performs a ruler's functions; a parent attends to parental duties and a court's functions are judicial. The functions are distinct, but there is no distinguishing mark by which the authority of one person can be recognised from that of another, for authority itself has no such marks or distinctive features. The distinctions cited in the definitions mark, therefore, differences in the persons who exercise authority; in the persons over whom it is exercised and in the functions performed, but none in the nature of the authority exercised.

It may be further remarked that the prince acquires his authority by inheritance; the parent, at first, assumes authority by entering the married relation and it is afterwards confirmed and extended by law, and the judge of a court receives his through election or appointment. From these modes of the acquirement or bestowal of authority there arises a distinction between official and unofficial authority, but it denotes no difference in the nature of the authority exercised in either case.

Example; Character. The second and third sections of the condensed definition may be considered together, and though here termed Example and Character they stand for the persons who set the example

and possess the character. So it is to the persons that authority is ascribed and not to the things; and as a person is held up for an example on account of his character the two things are so closely co-related and interdependent that they cannot well be considered separately. These sections mean that only the example of persons of highest worthiness, and the character of persons of eminent social position and of superior mental acquirements—of each in its proper sphere—is authority.

Example that receives respect and admiration, by consent of general opinion, will command imitation and to that extent exercises authority. Character that is generally regarded as most worthy will, by reason of its conceded excellence, command admission of its superiority and to that extent will exercise authority. Persons of exalted social station are considered to have authority in their respective spheres of action, according to the general estimate of their worthiness, and the extent of their authority is commensurate with the example they set and the character they possess. The same is true of those who have attained eminence, by their superior intellectual endowments and mental acquirements, in any profession or avocation. Each is accepted, by general consent, as

having authority in the craft or calling in which he is known to be superior in quality of work or efficiency of achievement. Thus while persons may exercise unofficial authority in social matters or in departments of thought it is because such authority has been ascribed (*not written*) to them. And it is doubtful if that which is bestowed by ascription can properly, in the true sense of the word, be termed authority. Can this, which is always bestowed by scription, be of the same nature as that which is bestowed by *a*-scription? Is the language so poverty-stricken that an appropriate term cannot be devised to denote that to which the word authority is now misapplied? Would the word "commandibility" fit the case? Then there can be no term so absolutely unbefiting, no greater solecism of speech or writing than to refer to a person as "an authority." Yet it is done every day, as the result of ignorance, by those who pride themselves most on the correctness of their diction. A person may be an expert or an adept—but "an authority" never. That is, etymologically speaking, an impossibility. The use of the word in this sense is a piece of inexplicable stupidity, and will have its quietus.

Other changes will, in time, follow the introduction of "the Correct Concept."

During the life of a person to whom there has been an *a*-scription of authority it dwells in or adheres to the personality and is exercised by the person. After the death of the person the example set and the character possessed survive their exponent often for many succeeding generations. It is evident therefore that the ascribed authority inheres during life in the example and the characer; that to them authority is ascribed which is exercised by them through the personality.

The meaning of the condensed definition however is that according to the accepted concept of the nature of authority both example and character are, in their own inherent natures, authority. But when it is considered that example means a pattern, a copy, a model, and that character means the distinctive qualities of an individual the definition becomes a *reductio ad absurdum*; its incorrectness is thus demonstrated and hence it appears that authority is *not* either example or character.

Testimony or Witness; Precedent. Sections four and five of the condensed definition may be considered together because they are things upon which authority is bestowed by ascription, and they are so closely associated in their nature that they can be readily conjoined in this connection.

Testimony is authoritative in so far as it can command credence, and precedent has authority equivalent to the extent of its binding force. A precedent is the evidence of opinion and testimony is the evidence of fact. A precedent, according to the derivation of the term, refers to questions which have been passed upon, and derives authority from the sanction of usage and time—in which the personality of the witness—the author of the opinion converted into precedent—has been sunk and lost sight of. Testimony that is authoritative is the record of past events and transactions, which, handed down through the ages, survives the recorder whose personality has been swept away by the passage of time. Thus witnesses perish but testimony remains and it is that which has authority—the enrolled testimony and not its recorder; just as the opinion is the precedent and not its original enouncer. A book is not authority, but its contents, if they consist of testimony or precedents, may have authority.

But testimony is the declaration of a witness and precedent is something done or said which may serve subsequently as an example in like circumstances. And herein the absurdity of the definition appears for neither testimony nor precedent is authority.

From the foregoing analysis of the definitions of the word authority it appears that the accepted conception of it is that it means Power, Example, Character, Testimony and Precedent. But it also appears that it is none of these things; that its definitions as given are incorrect and that the accepted conception of its nature is an entirely erroneous one. Indeed, so vague and indefinite are the popular ideas of the subject, that if one were to ask a person who had been elected to office by what authority he held his office, in all probability, he would show a certificate of election and declare that to be "his authority." Or, if a person who had been appointed to office might be interrogated in like manner, he would be apt to display his commission as "his authority." Yet these documents are merely the evidences that authority has been bestowed upon their possessors.

(It is an interesting coincidence, possibly it will be to some minds an amusing one, that the phrase "his commission as his authority," is cited in the Standard Dictionary to show what authority *is* and is cited by the writer to show what authority *is not*. The writer made use of the phrase prior to consulting the dictionary.)

The question: What is Authority? previ-

ously propounded still awaits an answer. It has been shown that it is not what it is generally conceived to be; that it is not Power, Example, Character, Testimony and Precedent; which is to say that the definitions quoted from the various dictionaries are entirely erroneous, are wholly incorrect, are totally defective and it remains to explain the correct concept of authority and to formulate its correct definition.

II. AUTHORITY; THE CORRECT CONCEPT.

On a memorable occasion one said: "I am a man in authority, having men under me. I say to one, Go! and he goeth; to another, Come! and he cometh; and to another, Do this! and he doeth it."

In this simple narration we have all the elements or component parts of the subject. First, a man endowed with authority; second, those inferior and in subjection to him; third, the commands Go, Come and Do; fourth, obeyance (this is a new word and means the act of obeying); fifth, the manifestation of power; sixth, action. In order to obtain obeyance the subject to whom the command is addressed must possess or be endowed with the quality of obedience. The command requires its fulfilment by an act or by its omission. The right of authority—its indispensable and inalienable right—is that which qualifies it to compel obeyance of its commands by force.

Authority, scriptively bestowed, by its exercise in the spoken word or impressive gesture exerts power on and over its subjects—personal power on personal subjects. The correlative of commandence (a new word proposed as a synonym for authority) is obedience; the correlative of command is obeyance and the correlative of power is action or the cessation of action. Authority can bid and forbid; its commands are limited to three: Go, Come and Do and their negatives, and these include every human action.

We say, commonly enough: with a courageous air or in a courageous manner. Likewise we say: with an authoritative air or in an authoritative manner. The courageous air and manner denote the possession of courage. Courage we know to be a quality of the mind, a natural endowment of the soul. A quality, then, is something which imparts itself to the air and manner. Authority does this; *therefore*—IT IS A QUALITY.

Courage is the quality that enables its possessor to encounter dangers and to overcome difficulties. Authority is the quality which enables its possessor to command. Courage is an inherent quality, bestowed by Nature. Authority is an extraneous quality, bestowed by Society in accordance with law. It is then an attributive quality. If we unite

these separate parts of our definition it sets forth the new and correct concept of authority as "the attributive quality which enables its possessor to command." It may be bestowed on persons by scription or ascription. Persons upon whom authority has been bestowed by ascription can issue only unofficial commands, which may be complied with or not at the will of the person to whom they are addressed.

Authority bestowed upon persons by scription is both personal and official, but in performing the functions of office its possessor must exercise it impersonally; that is to say it is to be exercised as though its possessor was a thing. Which means that the officer must, in the performance of official duties, sink his personality and have no more personal interest in the results of his official actions than if he were a stock or a stone. Such a course would mean the ideal exercise of authority; something which may not be looked for in the present state of society.

Authority is bestowed by inheritance, by election, by appointment and by general consent. Primary authority is assumed, that is in primary organizations each bestows authority on himself. Primitive authority was a fact recognised in the phrase, "born leaders of men." In primitive ages those were

chosen to be chiefs who were endowed with natural commandence and this, having been established, came in time to be recognised as a family possession and so was transmitted by inheritance—a method of bestowal continued in many countries at the present day.

In the bestowal of authority by election, each man who votes for a candidate, when he drops a ballot in the box, by that act in effect declares: "I bestow my authority on the person or persons whose names are written on this ballot; upon such an one to perform the functions of governor for me; upon such an one to perform the functions of legislator for me; upon such an one to perform the functions of judge for me, and so on.

The person or persons upon whom the preponderance of authority is bestowed (or who, in the phraseology of the law, receive a majority of the votes) are, by the laws governing this method of its bestowal, declared to be elected to perform the duties of office. So when President McKinley, in his first inaugural address, spoke of the authority with which he was invested by virtue of his oath of office he simply did not understand whence he derived his authority. The oath he took was only a ceremony connected with his induction into office. The authority he was to exercise thenceforth for four years

was vested in him by the 7.101.439 persons who bestowed their authority on him to perform the duties of President for them—which was 598.274 greater than the number of persons who bestowed their authority on his opponent. A majority of the people of the United States vested Mr. McKinley with their authority and he was not vested with it by virtue of any oath—which, though regarded as a solemn formality, could be omitted without peril to the country, the constitution or the flag.

In the case of election the authority conferred by each voter is that which in the primary organization of society is assumed and which is afterward confirmed to each member of society by law.

Authority may be transferred from one country or nation to another. Thus when Spain relinquished her hold upon Cuba, Porto Rico and the Phillippine Islands she simply gave up to the United States her authority over the land and the people of those islands. In consequence of this transfer of authority the people of the United States, through the officials chosen by themselves, are enabled to lay upon the people of those islands the commands of the executive in the shape of orders; the commands of the legislature in the form of laws and the com-

mands of the judiciary by the issuance of court decisions. The United States rules the people of those islands; governs them; has dominion over them; has warrant for all its acts therein; has authorization and justification for the doings of its officials in connection therewith; has control, sway, domination and sovereignty over the islands and the people thereof solely and simply through and by virtue of the authority transferred by Spain to this country.

It is safe to assert that if the Supreme Court of the United States had the correct concept of authority that body would have been, irrespective of points of law, a unit in the Porto Rico decisions. In their opinions the judges of the court lay much stress upon the "power" or "powers" of the court and they use the term in the sense which usage of the courts has attached to it. According to the judicial idea a "power" of the court is something which "the court" can do, in the course of, or in the matter of a legal procedure. The use of the term -power- in this sense is, in a measure, a superstition from which the Supreme Court should be free. The court possesses authority which enables it to do things. It is not "power" that does this. The court is authorized, not empowered. To be exact the latter term has no

meaning for it expresses a psychological impossibility. So if the Supreme Court had understood the correct concept of authority there would have been, there could have been no dissenting opinions in the Porto Rico cases.

Also when the members of Congress shall come to know what authority means they will learn that they can enact a law to annex the island of Cuba to the United States, for Congress has the authority to do that very thing. The Cubans are clamoring for freedom and the people of this country desire that the wishes of the Cubans shall be gratified—by making them citizens of the freest country on earth. The United States has the authority and can annex the land and its inhabitants, *nolens volens*. There may be technical considerations which nullify these profounder convictions, but they need not prevent the only solution of the question.

This is a digression in seeming only. The views advanced are the logical results flowing out of the new concept and not chimerical divagations.

It may be remarked in this connection that the exercise of authority by the courts comes nearer to the ideal than it does in any other department of government, yet even in the courts its exercise is sometimes tinct-

ured—nay, even tainted with partisanship.

Authority bestowed by ascription or general consent is that which enables a precedent to command that its content shall be followed; a character to command respect and admiration; example to command imitation and testimony to command credence. The consensus of opinion is discriminating and does not bestow authority on unworthy objects; a precedent must have weight and binding force; a character must possess excellence; example must be most admirable and testimony needs to be credible before authority will be bestowed upon them—and when so awarded these things have authority but are not themselves authority.

Authority may be grasped on occasions, as in great crises; in the midst of spontaneous uprisings—as of mobs, outbreaks, revolutions and the like—when the "born leader" will come to the front, take his natural place and assume commandence for the time being.

In the relation of master and man, of employer and employée, authority is bestowed upon the master by the man, by the unanimous vote of one; each man choosing his master for himself; each man electing his master as such and bestowing for himself, on the master, authority to be exercised over himself, in regard only to matters agreed

upon, and for a specified period.

Authority is a psychic quality and the power it exerts is spiritual. The fact that it is a quality, and the only quality which can be added to and subtracted from the personality, will furnish additional proof—if any were needed—of the spiritual nature of man; proof, as so many sages have asserted, that spirit is the only reality—the only thing which is immanent, imperishable and immortal.

The recognition of authority in its possessor is the evidence of its possession. So when it is written that "Christ spake as one having authority," it is the best proof that he was divinely commissioned, that is, that he was endowed with natural commandence.

His authority was innate and was of the highest order. He uttered commands that are obeyed to-day, such as: "Go ye into all the world," "Do this in remembrance of me," "Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy-laden,"—which latter is more a command than an invitation.

His power has extended over the civilized world and has penetrated the darkest and deepest recesses of barbarism; he set an example worthy of imitation by all; he showed a character of the noblest excellence; he established precedents which have binding

force to-day and will have for ages to come, and he left incontrovertible testimony as to the source of his authority. The validity of his power, the worthiness of his character, the excellence of his example, the value of his words and works are thus unimpeachable because he was endowed with authority.

Without authority there can be no power, Everything in nature of which we are able to take cognizance is regarded as a manifestation of the power of Deity. But there is a link lacking in the chain of sequences that leads to Deity which the correct concept of authority supplies. Thus:—atoms of matter assume form in accordance with the force applied to them; force results from the exertion of power; power can only proceed from the exercise of authority, and this quality pertains to a being endowed with the attributes of will, intelligence and consciousness. If now we qualify this series of sequences by infinity we have the irrefragible proof that Deity exists as an infinite being, endowed with inherent authority, which enables Him to utter the command: "Let these things be!" Further than this the concepts of a finite mind cannot extend; more it cannot grasp than the assured conviction of the existence of an infinite Being, endowed with consciousness, intelligence and will—self-

existent, eternal and clothed with infinite attributes—a Being who is GOD.

All disobeyances, all offenses, all crimes are done in opposition to, in resistance of the commands of authority. The law, which is the voice of authority, says to all men at all times, everywhere: "Thou shalt not." This mandate is often disregarded chiefly because mankind have had no adequate conception of the nature of authority; have not been able to apprehend and appreciate the part it performs in their daily lives; have been unable to dissociate it from the personality of the one who exercised it. Now they can conceive of it as something apart from the individual, as something whose mandates must be obeyed irrespective of personality. The youth of the future will be taught the lesson of respect for authority as such; obeyance of its mandates will become a habit and obedience will be cultivated as one of the highest virtues.

"Hitherto reason has been appealed to most generally as the governing power of life, but most of our beliefs are due to non-rational causes, as custom, education and public opinion, and these moral, social and educational causes produce results by psychic processes other than reasoning—processes which may be summed up in the one word

'authority.' So we must not forget that it is to authority rather than to reason to which in the main we owe not religion only but ethics and politics; that it is authority which supplies us with the essential elements in the premises of science; that it is authority rather than reason which lays deep the foundations of social life; that it is authority rather than reason which cements the superstructure. And though it seems to savor of paradox, it is no exaggeration to say that if we would find the quality in which we most notably excel the brute creation, we must look for it not so much in our ability of convincing and being convinced by the power of reason as in the quality through which we influence others, and are ourselves influenced by the power of authority, to-wit: the quality of obedience."—[A. J. BALFOUR.]

Sophocles has a sentence of similar import.—"Of those whose lives are kept in the right course the majority are saved by obedience."

Since the foregoing chapter on the correct concept of authority was written the writer has been led to modify his views of its nature somewhat. He has proposed the word commandence as its synonym, but now he is prepared to aver that authority has no synonym and none can be devised for it. Syno-

nymity means sameness and sameness implies equality. There is nothing the equal of authority, and in the nature of things there can be nothing. It is the sole occupant of its realm. It is generally bestowed by scription, though sometimes by spoken words which have the same force as when written. It is generally, too, official, though in some cases—as between master and man, principal and agent—it only borders on that character. But while not equal to authority commandence may be regarded as its equivalent, in the use of the term to designate that quality which is bestowed by ascription and is exercised unofficially.

The distinction is marked in the individual by the possession of that moiety of authority which pertains to him as a member of society and which constitutes him such and that quality meant by the poet in the lines:

> "I am the master of my fate;
> I am the captain of my soul."

This latter quality, known now as self-command, might well be termed self-command*ence*, for it is the equivalent of authority exercised over oneself, or the quality which enables one to control oneself; authority being the quality which enables one to control others. So in the body politic there are two qualities, the equivalents of each

other; authority and commandence. The one is official, the other unofficial; the one is bestowed by scription, the other by ascription. The one is bestowed upon persons only, the other upon persons and things. The one enables its possessors to command the obeyance of its subjects and enforce their mandates, the other enables its possessors to command compliance but they cannot enforce their mandates. These differences in the modes of their bestowal, in the spheres of their exercise and in their method of exerting power marks the difference between authority and commandence. Their similitude appears in that they are both attributive qualities which enable their possessors to command. But this similitude does not imply a sameness of the two qualities, but the rather denotes the equivalence of each in its own sphere.

So the new definition, embodying the correct concept, will be formulated on these lines: that authority and commandence are not synonyms; that while similar they are not the same; that they are not equal, but each in its separate sphere of exercise is the equivalent of the other; and the use of each term must be limited to its own sphere.

The term which may be used in lieu of that absurd, that nonsensical, that ridiculous

phrase "an authority" and which will indicate the same thing is command*ent* or command*ert* or command*ept*, as the etymologists shall decide. The writer favors the latter term and regards it as a very suitable word.

Authority is exercised by persons in an official capacity; commandence by persons in an unofficial capacity. In addition authority is exercised in what may be termed a semi-official capacity. Thus parents, masters or employers and agents exercise authority; the first over children, the second over employées and the third act for those who have selected them over persons and in regard to matters specified by the principal. These three classes do not occupy official positions, but the relations they sustain toward those subject to them are regulated by law. In a certain sense, then, they are officers of the law, which makes their positions as parents, masters and agents semi-official; and they will be so classed in the new definition.

In his "History of Civilization in France" M. Guizot remarks: "Words have never been wanting to facts; wherever words are wanting it is probable that there are no facts."

The word may be said to prove the idea, at least, and if the idea is lacking there is no word for it. So when new ideas are evolved new terms are needed to designate them.

These must be coined in the author's brain. The writer has added a few new words to the language which he has found serviceable.

The list of them follows:

Tertianation.	*To tertianate.*
Tertianating.	*Scription.*
Scriptive.	*Scriptively.*
Obeyance.	*Disobeyance.*
Obeyant.	*Disobeyant.*
Obeyantly.	*Disobeyantly.*

Scription is the opposite of ascription. All recognised authority is bestowed by scription; commandence is conferred by ascription. Printing is a form of writing and all laws are first written; so all authority except that which may be given hurriedly, temporarily and orally is bestowed by scription. Its adjective and adverb are its necessary verbal relatives.

Obeyance is coined to denote the act of obeying. Its contrary and their adjectives and adverbs naturally follow. Obedience, that has done duty for both act and quality, will be limited to expressing the quality.

Tertianation, the faculty, and to tertianate, the verb active, have been defined. The meaning of the present participle, tertianating, is hence obvious.

After what he has written in regard to sundry definitions it is scarcely worth while

for the writer to ask the lexicographers to deal gently with these new words. If they shall prove useful and are adopted by writers they will occupy their places in the dictionaries. In such case let care be taken to define them correctly. The lexicographers are a vulnerable lot and the writer will be delighted to show up some more of their weak points; and he will do it too, if his efforts in the direction of correct lexigraphy shall not receive due and proper recognition.

THE NEW DEFINITION OF AUTHORITY.

With some possible emendations and modifications the definition of Authority will hereafter read as follows:

AUTHORITY.—(Definition formulated by EUGENE H. WOOD, A. M., M. D. in 1901.)

The attributive quality which enables its possessors to command the obeyance of those subject to them, and to enforce their mandates.

Exercised, (1) *officially* Authority is bestowed:

(a) By inheritance; as, in the case of kings and queens, emperors and empresses, czars and czarinas and other potentates, who inherit authority in succession to a deceased predecessor.

(b) By election; as, in countries in which the constitutional system has been adopted, where the person who receives the preponderance of authority from the voters of the the country is declared to be elected to office.

(c) By appointment; as, when persons holding a high office appoint other persons to positions of lower grade, under themselves, bestowing authority in all matters pertaining to the lower office, though subject to their (the superiors') supervision.

Exercised, (2) *semi-officially*, Authority is

bestowed npon parents by law to enable them to govern their children. The authority conferred upon an agent by a principal and that granted by the employée to the employer are regulated by law.

Exercised, (3) *unofficially*, Authority is bestowed by Nature, as recognised in the phrase "born leaders of men." "Among the children of a family there are some who continue to be more honored and more powerful than the rest and to make themselves obeyed (sometimes indeed by their elders,) in virtue of nothing but their moral and mental qualities."—PROF. HUXLEY.

Authority is the supremest thing on earth; it has no synonyms. Those things which formerly were regarded as its synonyms all proceed or are derived from it. The equivalent of authority is commandence.

COMMANDENCE.—The attributive quality, which, bestowed by ascription upon persons and things, enables them—if persons to command compliance with their behests—if things, example may command imitation; character, admiration; testimony, credence; precedent, weight or binding force.

(a) Those persons who, occupy prominent social rank, who are held in high regard by society, on account of their general worthiness, and who, by reason of being well in-

formed on some particular topic or branch of knowledge—the cultivation of which tends to the well-being and conservation of society —have commandence ascribed to them by the consensus of opinion. The acts, sayings and writings of such persons in reference to such special subject have the weight and influence which example and character can alone impart to them; and on this basis their author's commandence rests.

(a2) Those persons who have attained eminence in any profession or avocation by reason of their superior intellectual endowments and mental acquirements, or by reason of the superiority of their work in any craft, or by reason of the efficiency of their achievement in any calling, have commandence ascribed to them on account of their reputations (=character) in their several departments of thought and action by the common opinion of society. The commandence which such persons can exercise is co-equal with their characters.

(a3) Those persons who, by uprightness of life and honorableness of conduct are thus distinguished above their fellows by general respect and esteem may command admiration and imitation of their example, and to that extent commandence will be ascribed to them by common consent.